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9 Managing religious diversity and 
promoting active citizenship 
Muslims in Australia, Britain and 
Germany 
Mario Peucker and Shahram Akbarzadeh 
The official stance on multiculturalism in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Germany could hardly have differed more in the early 201 Os. While multi-
culturalism has fallen out of favour in the UK and been rejected in Germany, the 
Australian government under Julia Gillard reaffirmed its commitment to Aus-
tralia's long-standing diversity policy in early 2011 by adopting the long-awaited 
new multicultural policy The People of Australia. In line with Australia's policy 
tradition since the 1970s, and replacing the previous 2003 policy statement Mul-
ticultural Australia - United in Diversity, the new framework emphasises the 
principles of inclusion and equality, 'respect and support of cultural, religious 
and linguistic diversity' in a 'socially cohesive nation' (Department of Immigra-
tion And Citizenship [DIAC] 2011). As part of this renewed commitment, the 
Gillard government established the Australian Multicultural Council, launched 
in August 2011, and announced several other key initiatives to combat racism 
and strengthen equity. 
Germany's diversity and integration politics appear to have little in common 
with such a multicultural policy model. Against the backdrop of heated public 
debates on the alleged unwillingness or inability of Muslims to integrate in 
Germany, Chancellor Merkel publicly stated in October 2010 that the 'multi-
kulti' approach had utterly failed ('Kanzlerin Merkel erklart' 2010). Merkel's 
speech was received with great interest around the globe. The irony, not gener-
ally noted in the media coverage, was that Germany had never adopted multicul-
tural policies, raising doubts about Germany's expertise and suitability to make 
such statements in the policy field of multiculturalism. 
Only a few months after Merkel's 'multikulti' statement, British Prime 
Minister David Cameron delivered a speech on Islamism in the UK at the Munich 
Security Conference in which he blamed the British doctrine of'state multicultur-
alism' for having encouraged cultural segregation and isolation (see also Chapters 
7 and 8 in this volume). Calling for a 'muscular liberalism' - instead of 'passive 
tolerance' - he highlighted the need for a stronger sense of British identity as a 
key mechanism of counteracting extremism (Cameron 2011 ). For years, Cameron 
publicly rejected 'state multiculturalism' as a divisive, 'wrong-headed doctrine' 
(Cameron 2008) that was overly focused on rights of difference and the alleged 
consequence of undermining the collective British identity. 1 
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Were Gillard, Merkel and Cameron actually talking about the same policies 
of accommodating diversity when they referred to multiculturalism? The answer 
is most likely no, given that this 'ism', according to social and political scien-
tists, 'means many different things to many different people in many different 
situations' (Jupp 2011: 41 ). What are the concrete notions and concepts behind 
this term; and is there a difference between the ridiculed 'multikulti' approach 
that has so 'utterly failed' in Germany, the wrong-headed doctrine of 'state mul-
ticulturalism' in the UK and 'the genius of Australian multiculturalism' as 
former Immigration Minister Bowen (201 la) put it in an address in Sydney in 
February 2011? 
Multiculturalism and the integration agenda 
Vertovec and Wessendorf(2009: 10) argue that multiculturalism can 'at best be 
described as a broad set of mutually reinforcing approaches to encourage the 
incorporation and participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities and their 
modes of cultural/religious difference'. According to these scholars, such 
approaches typically contain tenets aimed at reducing discrimination; promoting 
equal opportunities and access to core institutions and services; recognising cul-
tural identities and differences; and fostering diversity and mutual understanding 
(Vertovec and Wessendorf2010: 4). 
These principles occur across various policy statements and governmental and 
non-governmental reports on multiculturalism in Australia - from the Galbally 
Report in 1978 (Jupp 2011: 41--42) to The People of Australia policy framework 
in 2011. They have also reflected the British understanding of multiculturalism 
since its inauguration when, back in 1966, the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins 
described the basic tenets of migrant integration policies as 'equal opportunity, 
accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (in 
Hasan 2011 ). According to the influential Parekh report on the future of multi-
ethnic Britain, published in 2000, managing diversity in multicultural Britain boils 
down to three central concepts: '[e]quality, diversity and cohesion' (The Run-
nymede Trust 2000: 106). Somewhat surprisingly, however, the integration pol-
icies in many continental European countries without official multicultural 
agendas seem to bear strong resemblances with these British and Australian policy 
frameworks. In fact, most national government in the Western world - an excep-
tion might be to some extent France with its official cultural assimilation policies2 
- subscribe to these core principles that typically characterise multicultural pol-
icies. Even German policymakers across the mainstream political spectrum offi-
cially reject assimilationist claims and describe the incorporation of immigrants as 
a two-way process, guided by shared values and fundamental rights and duties; 
integration requires mutual efforts from both the majority society and immigrants, 
and the latter have the right to retain their cultural heritage and traditions. 
Germany has also adopted anti-discrimination policies and the government claims 
to seek to promote mutual intergroup understanding, participation and equal 
opportunities for all (Federal Government of Germany 2007). 
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What do national governments and policymakers in Germany, the UK and 
Australia actually mean when they refer to cultural diversity, equality, participa-
tion and social cohesion? These principles translate into five key policy areas: 
the recognition of diversity; maintaining cultural identity; collective group 
rights; equality, non-discrimination and anti-racism; and full participation and 
citizenship. 
Policy area 1: recognition of diversity 
A fundamental marker of multicultural policy frameworks is the unfaltering 
emphasis on the paramount contribution of diversity and immigration to the 
composition and well-being of society. This refers to what Modood (2011: 10) 
calls the 'positive vision' of a polity, which weaves differences into a common, 
distinctly plural national identity. In societies adopting officially multicultural 
policies, cultural diversity is often celebrated for its economic benefits and 
culturally enriching impact and, most importantly, described as a cornerstone of 
society. Many multicultural policy formulations give high prominence to this 
commitment to cultural diversity. 
Australia's new multicultural policy, The People of Australia, declares: 'The 
Australian Government is unwavering in its commitment to a multicultural Aus-
tralia. Australia's multicultural composition is at the heart of our national iden-
tity and is intrinsic to our history and character' (DIAC 2011: 2). Former 
Australian Immigration Minister Chris Bowen (2011 b: 6) underscored that 
'celebrating and valuing diversity' and 'communicating the benefits of Austral-
ia's diversity' are among the core principles of the new multicultural agenda. 
Such a high appreciation of diversity not only manifests itself in official policy 
statements, but has also been institutionalised through the establishment of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental bodies at the federal, state and local levels, 
such as the Australian Multicultural Council3 and numerous statutory multicul-
tural commissions, offices and councils. Moreover, the commitment to multicul-
turalism and diversity has been enshrined in federal and state legislation, like the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Act of 19834 or specific state laws 
such as the Multicultural Victoria Act 2011. 
Such explicit support, and the legal and institutionalised foundation to uphold 
emphasis on the fundamental principle of diversity, is rare in countries without 
explicit multicultural policies. Instead cultural diversity is often seen in Germany 
and, more recently, also the UK as an empirical fact that can - if managed prop-
erly - be beneficial to the society as a whole. Without political intervention 
aimed at the integration of minorities, however, diversity is deemed to increase 
tensions and social frictions. 
. The tone of British policy formulations on cultural diversity has changed sub-
stantially over the last decade. At the turn of the new century, in the aftermath of 
the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Meer and Modood 2009: 477), the UK was 
s~ongly committed to cultural diversity. But that explicit support and celebra-
:tiQn of plurality largely disappeared from policy papers and political rhetoric 
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with the 'civic turn' (Mouritsen 2008) which emphasised migrants' and minor-
ities' 'duty to integrate' (Blair 2006). 
In Germany, policy documents and statements over the past decade have 
generally recognised the existing cultural plurality. They indicate, however, that 
it is the successful integration of immigrants that is enriching and an asset for 
society, not diversity (Federal Government of Germany 2006: 5). In the preface 
to the 2006 National Integration Plan, the government's first roadmap to integra-
tion, Chancellor Merkel describes Germany as a 'cosmopolitan country' with a 
migrant population of 15 million people, 'most of whom have found their place 
in Germany' (Federal Government of Germany 2007: 7). This brief opening is 
followed by her highlighting integration deficits, such as deficiencies in German 
proficiency, unemployment and social self-isolation among migrants. In the 
same document, the Integration Commissioner recognises the 'reality' that 
Germany has changed culturally, economically and politically through immigra-
tion, which entails many chances as well as the danger of social tensions 
(Federal Government of Germany 2007: 9).5 This approach shifts the onus of 
integration to migrants and minorities. It is but a stage away from blaming 
immigration and diversity for social and cultural tensions and conflicts. 
Policy area 2: maintaining cultural identity 
In a society committed to human rights, cultural assimilation is not an option. 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights demands 
that members of 'ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities ... shall not be denied 
the right ... to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language' (United Nations General Assembly 1966). This 
provision specifies Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
'Everyone . . . is entitled to realization ... of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality' 
(United Nations General Assembly 1948). 
The rejection of cultural assimilation in Australia, Germany and the UK, 
based on the acceptance that immigrants and minorities are not required to 
abandon their cultural heritage, is compliant with these universal human rights 
obligations. Australia's multiculturalism policy agenda takes a particularly 
strong stand towards this principle, emphasising - more than current policy 
statements in Germany and Britain - that the entitlement to 'celebrate, practice 
and maintain their cultural heritage, traditions and language within the law and 
free from discrimination' is a pivotal element of the fundamental rights and lib-
erties of all Australians (DIAC 20 I 1: 6). The policies pursued in Australia, 
Germany and the UK on the question of cultural heritage differ on three axes, 
which will be examined below. 
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Legal or administrative concessions? 
Legal and administrative regulations within the context of multiculturalism 
provide greater religious and cultural freedom to minority groups than with other 
more integrationist policy frameworks. On the contrary, state laws informed by 
cultural assimilationism tend to restrict religious and cultural practices, for 
example the headscarf ban for students in France. 
In Germany the implementation of a headscarf ban for Muslim high-school 
students is not on the national agenda. But several German states have amended 
their school laws to prohibit Muslim teachers from wearing a Muslim headscarf 
in public-school classrooms, while Christian symbols and clothing remain 
largely accepted. No legislation of this kind has been adopted in the UK or Aus-
tralia. Rather, legislators and policymakers in these two countries have actively 
reviewed and changed existing regulations and legal provisions to ensure a 
higher level of tolerance to religious requirements of Muslims and other minor-
ities such as Sikhs. In several Australian states, and all over Britain, female 
police officers of Muslim faith are permitted to wear a headscarf as part of their 
police uniform. The British Parliament even passed a law, the Motor Cycle 
Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976, to exempt Sikhs from wearing 
a helmet when riding a motorbike - a level of concession to religious minorities 
currently unthinkable in Germany. 
The legal and administrative regulations on halal slaughtering are another 
example of the efforts made to accommodate minority needs in diverse societies. 
In Germany, the right to ritual slaughtering without prior stunning of animals is 
limited as it is considered to collide with Germany's animal welfare laws; per-
missions are only granted on the basis of restrictive exceptional regulations and 
nave been subject to ongoing political debates. Consequently, the availability of 
ilalal food remains limited to Arabic or Turkish niche retailers. In the UK and 
Australia, administrative and legal issues on the production of halal food have 
long been resolved and halal food is generally available. Halal slaughtering is 
largely permitted in both countries provided specific requirements are met and it 
is carried out in approved slaughterhouses. Animal welfare regulations have 
been amended to accommodate the special dietary needs of Muslim and Jewish 
communities.6 In Australia, governmental bodies and Muslim organisations have 
been working together to establish a reliable system of producing and certifying 
halal food, regulated by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
(AQIS) and supervised by selected Muslim organisations. 
Active support to maintain cultural identity? 
A comparative examination of the German, British and Australian approaches to 
minority language education broadcasting programmes is revealing. In Australia, 
the 1978 Galbally Report argued, in stark contrast to previous political attempts 
of cultural and linguistic assimilation, that language diversity within Australian 
society was not a threat to national unity (Jupp 2011: 48). This viewpoint on 
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community languages has informed policies such as the National Policy on Lan-
guages (Lo Bianco 1987), which emphasised that 'the linguistic diversity of 
Australia has social, cultural and economic potential to offer'. It further noted 
that community languages should be 'recognised and supported by the Austral-
ian language policy' (Lo Bianco 1987; see also Gibbons 1997: 210). The com-
mitment to the linguistic diversity of the Australian people is also reflected in the 
government's support of community languages education and of ethnic and mul-
tilingual broadcasting programmes. 
The Commonwealth and state governments have been promoting minority 
language education for immigrants by allocating funding to ethnic community 
groups and community language schools (see, for example, Community Lan-
guage School Program of the Victorian State Government). These language 
schools provide after-hours language teaching and cultural maintenance pro-
grammes, complementary to mainstream schools in Australia. In 2010-2011, 
several state governments, for instance Victoria and New South Wales, signifi-
cantly increased their financial and organisational support for community lan-
guage schools. Australia's commitment to maintain a multilingual media 
landscape also shows the country's support for minorities in retaining their cul-
tural and linguistic identity. The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) was 
launched in I 975 with an explicitly multicultural agenda commissioned by Com-
monwealth law, to cater for the communication needs of a multi-ethnic and mul-
tilingual population. Eighty per cent of the SBS's funding is provided by 
(federal) government sources (Jolly 2007). In addition to the SBS TV and radio 
programmes, the Commonwealth government supports the operation of multilin-
gual ethnic community radio stations across Australia, giving a public voice to 
numerous ethnic and religious groups, including Muslim immigrant communities 
from a variety of countries. In May 2011, the Labour government under Gillard 
announced that additional funding would be granted to ethnic and indigenous 
community broadcasting. 
The German experience is very different. Germany's state governments estab-
lished comprehensive mother-tongue education programmes for immigrant chil-
dren in the 1970s, but this was done with an entirely different intention. 
According to an official policy agreement between the German federal and state 
education ministers on the 'schooling for children of foreign workers' in 1976 
and 1979 (Kultusministerkonferenz 1979), mother-tongue instructions needed to 
be organised for young foreigners in German schools. The rationale behind this 
agreement was that the immigrants' mother-tongue proficiency would facilitate 
their reintegration in their countries of origin. It was thus not a sign of recogni-
tion of cultural and linguistic diversity, but - rather to the contrary - a measure 
aimed to encourage foreign workers and their families to leave Germany. When 
German policymakers realised in the late 1990s that guest workers had become 
permanent residents, government funding for mother-tongue classes decreased 
or ceased entirely in most German states. According to policymakers, this money 
was better invested in expanding German language programmes, especially ~t 
preschool level (Bosch and Peucker 2007: 50-51 ). A similar picture emerged 10 
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terms of government support for ethnic and multilingual media, which is much 
less vibrant than in Australia. In the absence of federal funding, only very few 
multilingual radio programmes received suppmt in certain regions or states, 
usually run as web radio and/or as part of mainstream radio stations. Ethnic or 
migrant community broadcasting programmes do not receive financial support 
from the government. 
The UK does not pay much attention - nor funding -- to assist ethnic minor-
ities in maintaining their language. Since the 1980s, the government has pro-
vided 'bilingual support' in schools with a high proportion of ethnic minority 
students with a mother tongue other than English. This rather limited offer of 
bilingual education relies on adult members of ethnic communities who are 
fluent in English and their community language to act as 'bilingual classroom 
assistants'. These provisions do not aim, however, to enhance the children's 
capacity to speak and maintain their mother tongue, but serve as a transition tool 
primarily in the early years of schooling, aimed at teaching immigrant children 
English (Martin-Jones and Saxena 2003: 267). The UK government on the local 
or national level does not invest in supporting the maintenance of ethnic lan-
guages as this is 'seen as a minority concern' (Wei 2006: 78). This rather passive 
stance reflects the British laissez-faire version of multiculturalism that sets it 
apart from the interventionist and proactive approach that has prevailed in Aus-
tralia since the late 1970s. 
Within the scope of its general support scheme for community radio stations, 
the British government has licensed and co-funded, among other things, not-for-
profit radio services targeting minority ethnic or religious groups. This govern-
mental support, which is coordinated by the statutory body Ofcom, is available 
to all non-commercial radio stations that successfully demonstrate that they 
'deliver a social gain' (Ofcom 201 O: 3). As of November 2010, some 20 per cent 
of the current 181 community radio stations on air broadcast a programme 
addressing certain ethnic minority or religious groups (including Muslims). This 
government scheme helps minority communities to maintain a sense of cultural 
identity. The benefits are, however, by accident, not by design, as the licensing 
criteria make no specific reference to 'multicultural' objectives. 
Requesting commonly sltaretl value.5: m>simi/ationist te11tle11cies? 
Australia's multicultural policies have taken a traditionally strong stance on the 
promotion of a national identity and respect for fundamental Australian values. 
Already back in 1973, Al Grassby, then Immigration Minister in the Whitlam 
government, emphasised in his speech 'A Multi-Cultural Society' that celeb-
rating diversity and being member of the 'family of the nation' striving towards 
the 'common good' are two sides of the same coin (in Gardiner-Garden 1993: 
3). More than 20 years later, in April 1995, the then Australian Prime Minister, 
Paul Keating, described the 'essential balance' of the Australian 'multicultural 
equation' in his opening address to the Global Cultural Diversity Conference in 
Sydney: 
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The promotion of individual and collective cultural rights and expression on 
the one hand, and on the other the promotion of common national interests 
and values and success depends on demonstrating that each side of the equa-
tion serves the other. 
(Keating 1995) 
fn 2011, this balanced equation of cultural rights and commonly shared values 
continues to shape Australia's multicultural agenda. Under the heading of 
'Rights and Responsibilities' The People qf' Australia specifies Australians' 
entitlement to 'celebrate, practice and maintain their cultural heritage, traditions 
and language' and underscores the 'shared rights and responsibilities that are 
fundamental to living in Australia' as enshrined in the citizenship pledge: loyalty 
to Australia and its people, shared democratic beliet~ the rule of law, and respect 
of the rights and liberties of Australia (DIAC 2011: 6). 
According to this policy formulation and recent public statements of leading 
government representatives, Australia's national identity and basic values are 
described as being characterised by the positive recognition of its diversity and by 
the principles of equality and fairness. 'Australia's multicultural policy comple-
ments our national characteristics of equality and a fair go for all', as the then 
Immigration Minister Chris Bowen and the Parliamentary Secretary Kate Lundy 
put it, in their message included in The People qf' Australia (DIAC 2011). In her 
speech at the launch of the Australian Multicultural Council in August 20 I I, 
former Prime Minister Julia Gillard (20 I I) highlighted that '[b ]clief in equality 
stands proudly at the heart of this country's character'; and she continued by 
stressing the pivotal role of multiculturalism that describes 'our love of the things 
that bind us together and our respect for the diversity that enriches us'. Request-
ing minorities to respect and accept these fundamental values can hardly be 
described as exclusionary, and it does not collide with the desire of migrants and 
minorities to maintain the cultural and religious components of their identity. 
In Britain there used to be little attention to the promotion of common British 
values and a sense of national identity (Modood 2005: 52), especially in relation 
to the political efforts aimed at providing a framework of equality within which 
minority differences could be cultivated. This British version of multiculturalism 
has been non-interventionist from the beginning. It was not until after the 2001 
riots in northern English cities, compounded by the debates in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that policymakers turned to the importance of a shared 
sense of belonging. Especially after the 7/7 London bombing, the Labour gov-
ernment adopted increasingly critical views on its multicultural race relation 
policies, claiming that British multiculturalism had resulted in 'plural monocul-
turalism' (Sen 2006), and a society 'sleepwalking to segregation', as the then 
head of the Racial Equality Commission put it (Phillips 2005). This was also the 
time when Tony Blair gave his 'duty to integrate' speech, in which he put the 
onus on migrants to integrate and to 'conform to the virtues of tolerance' (Blair 
2006). Meer and Modood (2009) have identified this as a rebalancing of British 
multiculturalism that views integration and diversity at two opposite ends. This 
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growing emphasis on integration and shrinking tolerance for diversity has 
become the dominant feature of the British approach to its Muslim population. 
How does Germany's integration agenda fare in terms of promoting common 
basic values and a shared national identity? In official integration policy docu-
ments, the German government urges migrants and their descendants to comply 
with three basic requirements: to learn the German language; respect the rule of 
law; and accept the basic values enshrined in the German constitution (Federal 
Government of Germany 2007: 7). While no political party would question these 
minimal requests, leading politicians from the conservative-liberal camp have 
openly expressed unease with the 'thin' extent of these requirements. The 
conservative-liberal government under Merkel (2009-2013) stated that 'we 
expect willingness on the part of immigrants to integrate and accept German 
society' (CDU, CSU and FOP 2009: 105). The government's roadmap, the 
National Integration Plan (Federal Government of Germany 2007), defined the 
basis of integration in reference to 'our concepts of values', 'our cultural iden-
tity' and 'our principles of freedom and democracy derived from German and 
European history'. There is an ongoing debate on what this concept of identity 
actually means and what 'our concept of values' encompasses. In 2000, a new 
term was thrown into the political ring, leitkultur (the dominant or leading 
German culture), and has become a regularly reoccurring but ill-defined expres-
sion to describe the values migrants are requested to respect, accept and sub-
scribe to. Attempts to specify the meaning of this 'dominant German culture' 
beyond constitutionally enshrined human rights, vaguely referring to humanism 
and Enlightenment, have remained blurry. Nevertheless, the term has been used 
in the political arena to demand cultural adaptation. fn recent years, parallel to 
the 'religionisation' of the integration debate, leading (mainly conservative) pol-
iticians have emphasised the Christian or Judeo-Christian dimension of Leitkul-
tur. In a speech on Muslim integration in 20 I 0, Chancellor Merkel made this 
more explicit than ever: 'We feel connected to the Christian ideals; this is what 
defines us' and she continued that those who do not accept this, do not belong in 
Germany ('Integration: Seehafer und Merkel' 2010) 
This static and ill-defined understanding of German identity does not reflect 
or recognise the diversity of German society. Instead, it generates exclusionary 
barriers for cultural and religious minorities, especially for Muslims. 
Policy area 3: collective group rights 
This comparison of the political approach to promote linguistic and cultural 
diversity in Germany, the UK and Australia points to an often fiercely disputed 
marker of multicultural policies: the promotion of collective rights of ethnic 
community groups (Kymlicka 1995). While national multicultural policies differ 
significantly in their country-specific approach to take minority group rights into 
account, they arc generally more geared towards the accommodation of such 
rights (in addition to individual rights) than other more intcgrationist policy 
agendas. 
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Government support and recognition of (ethnic or religious) minority agen-
cies is a policy field that illustrates this principle of collective rights on the prac-
tical level. Multicultural policies often encourage minority organisations to play 
an active role in expressing their own needs in the political arena and in assisting 
the settlement and inclusion process of their community members. Ethnic and, to 
some extent, also religious agencies and representations are more commonly 
regarded as partners and points of contact for governments, and as providers of 
specific services for their respective ethnic (or religious) communities. 
The Australian government transferred significant amounts of funding from 
mainstream welfare organisations (for example, the Good Neighbourhood Coun-
cils) to ethnic community organisations, including many Muslim community 
groups, in the 1970s. This political decision was one of the first practical meas-
ures marking the paradigmatic shift to multiculturalism policies in Australia. The 
responsibilities of ethnic organisations and cultural agencies, most importantly 
the Migrant Resource Centres, were enhanced and positioned as focal points on 
the ground, providing services for immigrants as well as offering advice to the 
government about the specific needs of their clientele (Jakubowicz 1989). More-
over, local ethnic community councils were funded and allied under the national 
umbrella body, the Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia 
(FECCA), established in 1979 (Jupp 2011: 48). This infrastructure of ethnic 
agencies has played an important role in Australia's settlement strategies and 
multicultural policies up to the present time. The Muslim communities in Aus-
tralia, too, have successfully set up a nationwide grass-roots organisational infra-
structure, with Islamic Councils on the state level and the Australian Federation 
of Islamic Councils (AFIC) as their nationwide peak organisations. They provide 
services and suppo1t to communities, operate private Islamic schools - funded 
by the government -·- in all major Australian cities and serve as points of contact 
for policymakers on the local, state and federal levels. Government support and 
recognition of these ethnic and religious institutions has contributed to the estab-
lishment of a vibrant and diverse landscape of ethnic and religious organisations, 
which often actively engage in political and public consultation processes across 
Australia. 
In contrast, in countries like Germany, ethnic organisations are often viewed 
suspiciously as potentially hampering instead of assisting integration by cement-
ing the immigrants' cultural heritage and their ethnic or religious ties. Such neg-
ative attitudes towards ethnic or religious agencies affect the governments' 
readiness to actively support and strengthen community structures and to put 
responsibility into the hands of these organisations. Germany's integration and 
settlement policies have traditionally relied heavily on mainstream welfare 
organisations - the two largest being affiliated with the Catholic (Caritas) and 
the Protestant Church (Diakonie) - and the trade unions, which have, since the 
1960s and 1970s, regarded migrant workers as part of their constituency. These 
mainstream agencies occupy a central position in Germany's corporatist welfare 
system (Esping-Andersen 1990) as vocal actors in the negotiation process over 
societal goods and status. With their extensive nationwide infrastructure on the 
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local level, the welfare agencies and trade unions have been playing a pivotal 
role in assisting the incorporation of immigrants (see also Soysal 1994). This 
role, however, has been characterised (albeit this applies less to the trade unions) 
by an underlying paternalism. These agencies have been concerned mainly with 
issues of social inclusion and labour market participation, whereas the struggle 
against racism and for civil and cultural rights of minorities has ranked very low 
on their agenda. Another weakness of their well-intended commitment was that 
these agencies defended their territory against migrant organisations and (ethnic 
and religious) minority agencies, hampering the emergence of ethnic or religious 
agencies (Kraus and Schonwiilder 2006: 212). Nevertheless, due to Germany's 
generally strong constitutional rights to freedom of association, migrants and 
minorities have been able to establish numerous organisations mainly on the 
local level. Without any institutional support or official recognition by the gov-
ernments, these ethnic or religious organisations have hardly obtained an audible 
voice in the political debate, and their potential roles as negotiation partners and 
advisors for the government have largely been ignored and/or viewed with sus-
picion by policymakers. It is only in the past few years that migrants and Muslim 
organisations have become more consolidated and have been increasingly con-
sulted by policymakers on the state and federal levels. 
Policy area 4: equality, non-discrimination and anti-racism 
Anti-racism, race relations and racial equality policies and legislation have long 
become a trademark of Britain's minority policies. They arc widely recognised 
as a cornerstone of British multiculturalism, in combination with a tolerant 
laissez-faire liberalism and the accommodation of ethnic diversity (Joppkc 1996; 
Fleras 2009: 177). The British Parliament passed the country's first anti-
discrimination law in 1965. The Race Relations Act (RRA) 1965 offered only 
limited protection against direct racial discrimination in public places and was 
amended through new legislation, such as the RRA 1968 and the RRA 1976, 
which increased the extent of legal protection against racial discrimination. In 
2000, the new Race Relations (Amendment) Act further broadened the definition 
of racial inequality by including issues of socio-economic inequalities and intro-
duced positive equality duties for public bodies to redress these manifestations 
of (structural) racial discrimination (for example, the obligation to develop, 
implement and monitor Racial Equality Schemes). With these advancements of 
non-discrimination legislation, the British anti-discrimination law entered a new 
era, described as 'transformative equality' (Hepp le 2010: 13). 
A major weakness of the amended legislation against racial discrimination in 
2000 was its failure to ban religious discrimination against Muslims. While Jews 
and Sikhs were, in this regard, considered to be quasi-ethnic or racial minorities 
and were thus covered by the ban against racial discrimination, 'the legal system 
· · · left Muslims pm1icularly vulnerable' (Modood 2005: 43). At best, Muslims 
Who were discriminated against enjoyed only 'second class protection' as they 
had to argue their case on the basis of indirect ethnic discrimination. Partly 
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driven by European Union (EU) obligations, religious discrimination has been 
increasingly considered in British laws since early 2003; for instance within the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, as well as the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. In 2010, the Labour government passed 
the Equality Act 20 I 0, which largely unified the dispersed anti-discrimination 
legislation and elevated the legal protection against religious discrimination to 
the same level as against racial discrimination. With this legal record, the UK is 
among the countries with the most comprehensive and long-standing anti-
discrimination legislation worldwide, going 'well beyond anything found in 
Europe' (Modood 20 I I: 2) both in terms of racial and religious equality 
legislation. 
In Australia, racial discrimination has been legally banned since the mid-
I 970s. Australia ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in September 1975 and simultan-
eously adopted the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA), which gives effect to Aus-
tralia's CERD obligations to promote equality and make racial discrimination 
unlawful. This piece of legislation was at the very heart of the paradigmatic 
policy shift in Australia that altered the focus from assimilation and integration 
to multiculturalism, and it has been a core element of Australia's multicultural 
agenda since that time. In Australia's current multicultural policy formulation 
The People qf Australia, one of four principles stresses the government's com-
mitment to 'promote understanding and acceptance while responding to expres-
sions of intolerance and discrimination with strength, and when necessary, with 
the force of the law' (DIAC 2011: 5). 
Initially, the RDA did not differentiate between direct and indirect discrim-
ination. A legal amendment in 1990 was aimed at addressing that gap, introdu-
cing a clear and comprehensive ban on indirect racial discrimination in Section 9 
(IA) RDA (Recs et al. 2008: 145). Religious discrimination or vilification is not 
explicitly mentioned by the RDA, which has been criticised by Muslim organi-
sations (Bouma et al. 20 I I: 46-50). However, the Act is usually interpreted 
rather broadly as to cover religious discrimination implicitly, through a wider 
understanding of ethnic origin or, alternatively, as a form of indirect racial dis-
crimination. The Federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 
(1986) bans religious discrimination in the employment sector specifying Aus-
tralia's international obligations grounded in the International Labour Organisa-
tion Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958. Despite 
this emerging body of anti-discrimination legislation, the President of the Aus-
tralian Human Rights Commission publicly expressed concerns about the 
ongoing inadequate level of legal protection against religious discrimination 
during a speech in Melbourne in July 20 I 0 (Branson 20 I 0). 
Robust debates on structural discrimination and a lack of equal opportunities 
deal especially with the exclusion and disadvantage of Indigenous Australians, 
but arc not limited to this realm. The strong emphasis in political announcements 
on equality for all ('a fair go') and the importance of equitable access to govern-
ment services and programmes responsive to the needs of Australia's diverse 
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communities, indicates that structural barriers are recognised as factors hamper-
ing full participation and equal opportunities of immigrants and minorities (sub-
stantive equality). To address these problems every public service 
Commonwealth authority has been obliged to implement equal opportunity pro-
grammes for 'designated groups' - such as Indigenous Australians and non-
English-speaking migrant families - since the introduction of the Equal 
Employment Oppo1tunity Act in 1987. The requirements placed on federal 
authorities can be interpreted as initial steps towards the notion of 'trans-
formative equality'. 
In Germany, an explicit ban on racial and religious discrimination has been 
enshrined in the German Constitution (Article 3) since 1949. However, this con-
stitutional principle only refers to the relationship between the state and its 
citizens and is not directly applicable to the wider sphere of civil or labour law. 
This constitutional clause used to be - together with a few other legal provisions, 
scattered in different pieces of labour legislation and along with a traditionally 
strong anti-hate speech provision in criminal code -· the only legal source to ban 
unequal treatment of migrants and ethnic and religious minorities in Germany. 
This legislative deficiency finally ceased in August 2006, when Germany's first 
anti-discrimination law, the General Equal Treatment Act, came into effect after 
years of political debate between political parties, church groups, employers' 
associations and trade unions (Bielefeldt and Follmar-Otto 2005). During these 
debates the bill was widely described as undesirable, useless and potentially 
harmful to mainstream society; such attitudes and accusations were widespread 
among the general population and in large parts of the mainstream media as well 
as being expressed by representatives of employers' associations and the conser-
vative and liberal political spectrum. 
The adoption of the General Equal Treatment Act in 2006 was largely driven 
by EU obligations. Despite some substantial legal protection gaps and proced-
ural sho1tcomings, the Act offers a broad level of protection against direct and 
indirect discrimination due to race, ethnic origin and religion in accordance with 
the EU legal expectations. Despite this comprehensive law, anti-discrimination 
barely plays a role in Germany's integration policies. Most official policy state-
ments fail to even mention the Act and largely ignore or downplay the role that 
discrimination plays as a barrier to integration and a threat to social cohesion. 
In contrast to the political discourse in Australia and the UK, a narrow under-
standing of discrimination and racism prevails in Germany. Discrimination con-
tinues to be mainly associated with purposeful misbehaviour of individuals; 
structural and indirect forms of discrimination are barely recognised as a sys-
temic hurdle in the integration process of migrants. Moreover, racism is com-
monly equated with right-wing extremism, ignoring everyday forms of racist 
behaviour or talk, intolerance and exclusion. In 2009, the UN Special Rappor-
teur on Contemporary Forms of Racism (United Nations Human Rights Council 
2010: 19) concluded his visit to Germany with the recommendation that 
Gennany should expand its narrowly applied concept of racism 'towards a com-
prehensive understanding of racism [and] racial discrimination' in line with the 
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ICERD definition: 'The question of racism should also be approached from a 
standpoint of structures and institutions that facilitate ... migrants in German 
society and that provide them with the necessary skills to allow them and future 
generations to prosper' (United Nations Human Rights Council 20 I 0: 16-17). 
While the German anti-discrimination law also prohibits indirect discrimination 
against ethnic and religious minorities, it encompasses few elements that indi-
cate the way towards 'trans formative equality'. On the contrary, the judiciary 
system appears to be reluctant or not sufficiently aware of how to interpret the 
concept of indirect discrimination; thus Germany's approach to tackling ethnic 
and religious discrimination through legal means rests primarily on the notion of 
'formal equality' -- an understanding that the UK had already dismissed as too 
narrow in the mid-1970s. 
Policy area 5 - full participation and citizenship 
Active citizenship and participation are closely intertwined concepts that encom-
pass not only full political rights, socio-economic resources and cultural capital, 
but also loyalty and personal commitment to social and civil life (Ameli and 
Merali 2004: 76; Marshall 1950: 8). The notion of 'citizenship of the heart', 
coined by Bassam Tibi (2007), highlights these emotional components of cit-
izenship. National diversity and inclusion policies in Australia, Germany and the 
UK formally recognise the importance of participation and citizenship as the 
civic spine of a vibrant and inclusive pluralistic society, but they differ signifi-
cantly in their approaches to promote full civic and political participation. 
National divergences are often illustratively reflected in the country-specific cit-
izenship regimes which do not only determine the access to equal political rights, 
but also send out a message on the (un)desirability of minorities' participation in 
general. Countries with strong multicultural agendas encourage immigrants to 
become full citizens, for legal citizenship is seen as a pivotal facilitator of inclu-
sion and commitment. Accordingly, hurdles in the access to legal citizenship are 
usually rather low. In contrast, countries with a policy framework tuned towards 
cultural adaptation tend to view citizenship rather as the crowning 'prize' that 
only well-integrated immigrants deserve, which often translates into stiffer 
requirements and higher legal barriers (Jurado 2008: 6-7). 
According to the British Nationality Act 1981 and subsequent amendments, 
would-be citizens need to have lived in the UK for the last five years to be 
entitled to apply for citizenship. As dual citizenship is not considered problem-
atic, applicants do not have to renounce their existing nationality or citizenship. 
Any person born in the UK to a parent settled in Britain (that is, holding a per-
manent residence permit) becomes a British citizen by birth. Over the past 
decade, the British citizenship regime has been in a process of profound change. 
In 2003, an advisory group, established by the British Home Office, stated that 
'becoming naturalised should not be seen as the end of a process but rather as a 
good beginning' (Home Office 2003: 13). This viewpoint used to be a key notion 
in Britain's multicultural policies, but has lost its prominence in recent years 
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with the government's civic turn. The most obvious indicator for this shift was, 
in addition to increased naturalisation requirements (e.g. citizenship test), the 
principle of 'earned citizenship', introduced by the Labour government through 
the Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The new provisions sought 
to extend the minimum duration of stay from five to eight years of lawful resid-
ence, and to introduce an incentive system which would allow migrants who 
have done active community work ('activity condition') to apply for citizenship 
after six years. In November 20 I 0, the newly elected government under 
Cameron, announced that it would not implement the policy of earned citizen-
ship, describing it as 'too complicated, bureaucratic and, in the end, ineffective' 
(Horne Office 20 I 0). 
The Australian government describes the acquisition of citizenship on its offi-
cial website as 'an important step in your migration story' and a sign of 'com-
mitment to Australia' (Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2013). 
Citizenship is regarded as a major facilitator of the immigrants' full participation 
in society. ft is unsurprising, then, that the acquisition of citizenship is strnngly 
encouraged as an important signal and, at the same time, a tool to foster the indi-
viduals' participation and commitment to society. In his speech in February 
2011, the Australian Immigration Minister described the country's 'citizenship-
centred multiculturalism' as a core reason why Australian multiculturalism has 
been so successful (Bowen 201 la). Legal barriers on the way to becoming a 
citizen continue to be low (despite the 2007 introduction of the citizenship test). 
A minimum of only four years of lawful residence in Australia is required to be 
eligible for applying for naturalisation and Australian law permits dual citizen-
ship. Children born on Australian soil, to parents of whom at least one is a per-
manent resident or Australian citizen, gain Australian citizenship automatically 
by birth. 
Germany's citizenship regime stands in stark contrast to Australia's. Despite 
groundbreaking changes that took effect with the 1999 Naturalisation Act, the 
hurdles to full citizenship rights are much higher. Since January 2000, would-be 
citizens must have lived in Germany for at least eight years and hold a perma-
nent residence permit. By law, dual/multiple citizenship is generally prohibited; 
in practice, applicants from outside the EU are obliged to renounce their nation-
ality unless this is legally or practically impossible under the national laws of 
their country of origin. Children born in Germany to non-German parents only 
acquire German citizenship if at least one parent has been lawfully living in the 
country for at least eight years and holds a permanent residence status. These so-
called ius soli children have to opt for either the German or their parents' nation-
ality before they turn 23. If no decision has been made, they generally lose their 
German citizenship automatically. 
In Germany, the perception of citizenship as a means of integration is less 
common, and it is dismissed in the centre-right political spectrum, led by Merkel 
since 2009. In October 2010, the Green Party's parliamentary motion pushed for 
a more 'welcoming naturalisation law' which would reduce the minimum resid-
ence requirement to six years, and abolish the strict regulations on multiple 
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citizenship and the citizenship test. The motion was rejected by the governing 
conservative-liberal coalition parties, describing the underlying notions as an old 
fashioned 'multikulti' delusion (Federal Parliament of Germany 2010: 
7243-7247): 'Naturalisation has to occur at the end of the integration process' 
because 'offering citizenship to immigrants who are not integrated undermines 
the cohesion of society'. 
Conclusion 
The liberal democratic system of government has proven to be a healthy frame-
work for the political integration of individual citizens. But in relation to cultural 
minority groups it seems less than fully equipped to promote integration. The 
failure to take into account the ethnic and cultural plurality of modern societies 
and the significance to these communities in instilling a sense of identity presents 
a challenge to liberal democracy. The German political system, for example, is 
all about individual rights and responsibilities. It was not designed to accom-
modate group rights based on ethnicity or religion. The growing realisation that 
ethnic identities do not disappear once migrants step across the border, has led to 
specific policies to address ethnic and religious minority needs. While the 
German model is making grudging steps to acknowledge its Muslim population 
as a permanent community- not as a transient experience - other Western states 
have made significant leaps forward in relation to these Muslim communities. 
The Australian model of multiculturalism, as argued in this chapter, presents a 
relatively successful approach to ethnic and religious plurality. The cornerstone 
of this approach has been the celebration of diversity as an asset that enriches 
Australia. This goes beyond tolerance and an ad hoc accommodation of differ-
ences, which tends to prevail in the British model of laissez-faire multicultural-
ism. In the Australian model, ethnic diversity and political unity go hand in hand 
in a mutually reinforcing relationship. By protecting the ethnic and religious her-
itage of its many people, Australia manages to win the hearts of its migrant com-
munities. This is perhaps the citizenship of the heart that Tibi (2007) favoured; 
loyalty and commitment to Australia, not for expediency, but based on an emo-
tional connection. The multicultural model has fostered loyalty to the state 
because it has facilitated the regeneration of minority identities through a series 
of political, legal and administrative safeguards. In the context of the current 
debate on the failure of Muslims to integrate in their secular host countries, the 
proactive multicultural model has demonstrated a strong track record in address-
ing issues of social and political integration. 
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Notes 
Sec Chapter 8 in this volume for a detailed account of the implications of this view on 
minority welfare provision in the UK. 
2 According to the Prench Code Civil, 'assimilation' is an explicit prerequisite for the 
acquisition of legal citizenship (Article 21-24). 
3 This federal council was launched in August 2011 and replaced -- with an enhanced 
mandate - the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council. These bodies continue a tra-
dition of foderal multicultural councils that had come to an end in 2006 under the 
Howard Liberal government, which was known for its sceptical attitude towards 
multiculturalism. 
4 According to Section 6 of the Act, the public broadcasting corporation AUC has to 
broadcast programmes that reflect the cultural diversity of the Australian community 
taking into account its 'multicultural character'. 
5 Until the late 1990s, the Getman government refused to oflicially consider itself a 
country of immigration - despite its experiences of large-scale immigration over the 
past half century. 
6 For the UK, sec Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995, amended 
in 1999 (Statutory Instrument No 19951731 as amended by SI No 1999/400). In 
Australia, state and territory governments have primary responsibility for animal 
welfare; respective state laws all permit slaughtering animals in compliance with 
Islamic rites. 
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